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Over the past decade, charitable contributions of intellectual 
property have grown rapidly. This growth has coincided with 
tremendous abuse as firms have sought inflated valuations of 
donated intellectual property in order to claim larger tax 
deductions. In 2004, Congress responded by passing section 882 of 
the American Jobs Creation Act, which drastically changed the 
rules governing donations of intellectual property. This iBrief 
argues that Congress, in addressing overvalued intellectual 
property donations, went too far in its efforts by failing to fully 
consider the importance of positive donor incentives. After 
discussing other proposed policies, this iBrief suggests a hybrid 
policy that combines strong donor incentives with protective 
measures against overvaluation. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 For many corporations, donating “orphan patents”2 and other 
intellectual property (IP) to tax-exempt entities is much more than just a 
philanthropic endeavor. Tax deductions for these donations3 make them an 
effective means of cutting costs.4 While the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate 2006, Duke University School of Law; B.A. in Economics, 
2003, Brigham Young University.  He is currently serving as managing editor of 
the Duke Law & Technology Review.   
2 Orphan patents are patents that are inconsistent with a company’s main 
technologies, are poor candidates for licensing to third parties, and have no 
defensive competitive market purposes.  RON LAYTON & PETER BLOCH, IP 
DONATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW 5 (Int’l Intellectual Prop. Inst. 2004) at 
http://www.iipi.org/reports/IP_Donations_Policy_Review.pdf [hereinafter IP 
DONATIONS].  
3 See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (providing a general deduction for 
charitable contributions).  
4 DR. DAVID MARTIN, SPECIAL REPORT: PATENT DONATIONS 2 (M·CAM 2003) 
(identifying beneficial consequences of donating intellectual property) at 
http://www.m-cam.com/downloads/20030108_donation-whitepaper.pdf. 
Because maintaining patents requires the payment of annual fees, patent 
donation not only results in tax deductions but it also lowers the costs of the 
donor.   
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has explicitly condoned this practice for at least 40 years,5 only recently 
have corporations begun the see its far reaching benefits.6 Unfortunately, 
the recent proliferation of IP donations has been accompanied with abuse as 
some donors have overstated the value of their donations in an effort to 
claim inflated tax deductions.7  
¶2 In response to this and other concerns, Congress drastically changed 
the law regarding the charitable donation of IP by enacting section 882 of 
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Creation Act),8 which is currently 
part of section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).9 Instead of 
permitting a fair market value (FMV) deduction of the donated IP, Congress 
limited the allowable deduction to the lesser of the property’s FMV or cost 
basis.10 Section 882 allows additional deductions on the donated property’s 
future revenue on a decreasing sliding-scale basis.11 This iBrief explains the 
steps leading up to Congress’s modification of the tax law that governs IP 
donations, and focuses on one of Congress’s leading motivators: the 
overvaluation of IP.12 It then argues that while Congress’s legislation 
effectively deals with the problem of overvalued IP donations, it failed to 
fully consider the importance of donor incentives.  After considering 
alternative policies, this iBrief proposes a hybrid policy that minimizes the 
overvaluation of IP while still preserving strong incentives for donations. 
                                                     
5 Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C.B. 126. 
6 Ron Layton & Peter Bloch, Please Donate Patents on the Shelf: Tax Benefits 
Can be Focused for Greater Good, 27 LEGAL TIMES 30 (2004) [hereinafter 
Greater Good]. 
7 See 150 CONG. REC. S. 11019-20 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Grassley).  See also Fred Stokeld, EO Provisions in Bush Budget Aimed at 
Stopping Abuses, 102 TAX NOTES 699, 700-01 (Feb. 9, 2004) (explaining a 
proposal aimed at stopping excessive deductions due to overvaluation of 
intellectual property) [hereinafter Stopping Abuses].  
8 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-755, at 532-35  (2004) (comparing section 682, later 
changed to 882, of H.R. 4520 with previous law), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/hr4520/hr4520conreptmgrsstatement
3.pdf [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].  
9 H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 882 (2004). 
10 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2005); H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 882 
(2004). The cost basis for IP generally consists of the asset’s historical cost less 
accumulated depreciation. See  26 CFR 1.167(a)-6 (2000). 
11 I.R.C. § 170(m)(7) (LexisNexis 2005).  
12 See I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310 (listing four primary concerns of 
the IRS with respect to charitable contributions of IP). 
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I.  EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE NEW LEGISLATION. 
A. History of Charitable IP Donations 
¶3 The practice of claiming charitable deductions for donated IP  is of 
fairly recent origin.13 The IRS first addressed this practice in the late 1950s 
through Revenue Ruling 58-260,14 giving taxpayers explicit authority to 
claim deductions for IP donated to certain qualified entities such as 
universities.15 Despite this ruling, the level of charitable IP donations 
remained stagnant16 until the Bayh-Dole Act of 198017 provided a 
conducive environment for donations. This Act empowered universities and 
other not-for-profit organizations to reap the commercial benefits of patents 
developed through federally funded research18 and provided incentive for 
these entities to develop the infrastructure necessary to accept large-scale IP 
donations.19 Only then did the charitable contribution of IP begin to 
proliferate.20 
¶4 Prior to the enactment of Section 882, the IRS permitted IP holders 
to deduct the FMV of IP donated to qualified not-for-profit entities.21 The 
policy behind this long-standing tradition was to encourage philanthropy by 
allowing taxpayers to contribute to their chosen charitable organizations at a 
subsidized cost.22 However, faith in this system began to waiver due to a 
variety of abuses during the late 1990s, such as the overvaluation of 
corporate IP donations.23 Responding to growing discord, the IRS issued a 
series of statements24 and notices,25 including one specifically warning 
                                                     
13 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.  
14 Id. 
15 Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C.B. 126; IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 4; See 
I.R.C. § 501(c) (2000) (defining exempt organizations).  
16 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.  
17 35 U.S.C. § 200-12 (2000).  
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 5. 
20 See IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.   
21 I.R.C. § 170(e)(B) (2000); CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 532.  
22 JACOB MERTEN, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 31:01 
(Westlaw 2003).  The cost is subsidized in the sense that the allowable tax 
deductions for the value of a charitable donation reduces the economic cost of 
the donation. 
23 Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Finance, Grassley 
Advances Crackdown on Car, Intellectual Property Donation Abuses (Oct. 6, 
2004), at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2004/prg100604d.pdf 
[hereinafter Press Release]; Fred Stokeld, JOBS Act Would Halt Inflated Values 
of Charitable Donations, 44 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 285 (Jun. 2004). 
24 See, e.g., Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from 
Happening to Good Charities, Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S. 
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taxpayers and IP “promoters and appraisers”26 that abuse of the charitable 
donation provisions of the tax code may result in penalties.27    
B. What Caused the Abuse?  
¶5  By the early 1990s, the growing importance of IP resulted in  
creation of a “new measure of corporate assets: IP Asset Management.”28 In 
response, several national accounting firms formed special consulting 
groups to help corporations manage their inventory of patents and other 
IP.29  Consultants soon realized that many corporations “were spending 
millions of dollars a year on [patent] maintenance fees,”30 some of which 
were protecting orphan patents that were not even being used.31 Consultants 
and company executives alike realized that prudent cost management 
required donating or abandoning these orphan patents.32 For many 
corporations, the tax benefits associated with donation made it an attractive 
option.33 The goodwill generated by charitable contributions, both within 
the community and with the donee, provided corporations with another 
reason to donate IP.34 
1. Factors Facilitating the Abuse 
¶6 Given the financial benefits of donating orphan patents and other 
IP, some abuse of the system is not surprising. This abuse has been 
facilitated primarily by the difficulty of valuing IP35 and the lack of strict 
                                                                                                                       
Senate, 108th Cong. (June 22, 2004) (written statement of Mark W. Everson, 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue), available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204metest.pdf.   
25 I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310; see also Rev. Rul. 2003-28, 2003-1 
C.B. 594.  
26 I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310. 
27 Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 6662, 6700, 6701, 6694 (West Supp. 2004).  
28 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2. Corporations often divide their assets into 
subgroups for accounting and other purposes (e.g. accounts receivable). IP Asset 
Management is one such subgroup, comprised solely of IP. 
29 Id.  
30 Greater Good, supra note 6 (describing the wasted fees of “innovative 
companies like the IBM Corp.”).  
31 Id.   
32 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2.  
33 See Barnaby J. Feder, Patent Donations Are Novel Corporate Gift, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at §3 page 5 (explaining that one corporation experienced 
a 3% reduction in its average tax rate due to patent donations); see also Greater 
Good, supra note 6 (relating that a company claimed a savings of over $40 
million during a five year period from donating patents). 
34 MARTIN, supra note 4.  
35 Terri W. Cammarano & Richard F. Riley, Jr., Valuation Remains the 
Toughest Issue When Donating Patents, 7 VALUATION STRATEGIES 18 (2003); 
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appraisal standards and guidelines.36 Valuation of IP is difficult in part 
because patents confer a right to prevent someone else from doing 
something, making their value somewhat dependent on the willingness of 
the holder to sue.37 Also, value depends on possible future income streams,  
the property’s technical feasibility, and many other factors that are similarly 
difficult to predict.38 Further complicating the issue is the inadequacy of 
IRS guidance with respect to valuation methods of IP.39 Today, there are 
several different methods of pricing,40 each of which may result in widely 
varying estimates of the same IP.41 For example, one corporate executive of 
a company experienced in donating patents reported remarkably divergent 
estimates on the value of a patent, with the highest appraisal being four 
times greater than the lowest appraisal.42   
¶7 Another problem that facilitated abuse was the IRS’s relaxed 
standards with respect to “qualified appraisers.”43 The IRS guidelines define 
a “qualified appraiser” merely as someone who “holds himself or herself 
out to the public as an appraiser”44 and who signs a document 
acknowledging that he or she understands the legal consequences of 
intentional overvaluation.45 While the IRS requires the donor to show the 
valuation’s accuracy,46 the subjective nature of valuating IP47 makes any 
rebuttal difficult except in the most extreme cases. These regulations hardly 
facilitate uniform valuation standards, and may have lead in part to many of 
the overvaluation abuses.48 
2. What Abuses Were Most Common? 
                                                                                                                       
Brenda Sandburg, Tax Write-Offs, Written Off: The IRS Cracks Down on Patent 
Donation Deductions, 04 IP LAW & BUS. 16 (Mar. 2004); Greater Good, supra 
note 7.  
36 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 40.  
37 Sandburg, supra note 35.  
38 Cammarano & Riley, supra note 35, at 28. 
39 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 40. 
40 Methods of pricing include the income method, the market approach, and the 
cost method. Milton Cerny, Technology Transfer and the New Economy, 47 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 39, 46 (Jan. 2005); Cammarano & Riley, supra note 37; 
Smith v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1981). 
41 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 7; Greater Good, supra note 7.  
42 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 7. 
43 Id. at 40-41.  
44 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(i) (West 2005).   
45 Id. at § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(i)(D).  
46 Cammarano & Riley, supra note 35. 
47 Greater Good, supra note 6 (arguing that patent valuations are often 
subjective and unreliable). 
48 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 41. 
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¶8 The IRS has listed four areas of abuse for which it has particular 
concern: (1) excessive valuation of donated property; (2) inadequate 
substantiation of donations; (3) claiming excessive deductions when 
consideration is received; and (4) claiming deductions for the transfer of a 
partial interest. 49 This iBrief considers the problem of overvaluation.  
¶9 As suggested above, a common method of abuse involved inflating 
the price of donated patents, thereby permitting donors to take larger than 
appropriate deductions.50 SBC Communications, which has been accused of 
claiming a deduction of over $7 million for donating an allegedly worthless 
patent,51 is just one example of this type of abuse. Companies such as 
Dupont and Eaton Corporation have also taken large deductions for patents 
of questionable value.52 
¶10 By the year 2000, donees began to realize that some IP cost more in 
annual maintenance fees than their alleged value.53 The University of 
Virginia, for example, ended up loosing money on a donated patent valued 
at more than $7 million.54 A professor involved later commented that “[t]he 
bottom line is that it cost us money with no benefit.”55 By 2001, most 
universities adapted to this reality by requiring donors to help pay for 
maintenance fees on any IP they accepted.56 Soon, stories of inflated 
valuations and other abuses involving charities became common 
knowledge, even implicating accounting giant KPMG.57 By 2004, the abuse 
was so prevalent that Congress, after discussing several legislative 
proposals,58 passed section 882 of the Creation Act.  
                                                     
49 I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310.  
50 150 CONG. REC. S. 11019-21 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Grassley); Press Release, supra note 24; Stopping Abuses, supra note 8.  
51 Teresa Riordan, Patent Donations Are Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, 
at C1.  
52 MARTIN, supra note 4, at 7-8, 10-11.  
53 See Feder, supra note 33 (explaining that some patents are not worth their cost 
in maintenance fees).  
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 6.  
57 Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good 
Charities, Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Senate, 108th Cong., at 
7 (June 22, 2004) (statement of Jay D. Adkisson, Editor of Quatloos.com), 
available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204jatest.pdf. 
58 Jerry J. McCoy, Contributions of Property: Winds of Change Blowing?, 
SK041 ALI-ABA 369, 376 (2004).  See, e.g., S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 494 (2004); 
Everson, supra note 24.  
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II.  SECTION 882  
A. The Framework 
¶11 Section 882 attempts to curtail overvaluation of IP by limiting any 
deductions to the lesser of the property’s FMV or cost basis.59 Subject to the 
following four requirements, the donor may receive additional deductions 
based upon the revenue the donee generates from the donated property.60 
First, additional deductions are limited to the aggregate donee earnings 
generated from the donated property that exceed the original donor 
deduction.61 For example, suppose company A donates a patent to 
university B valued at $2 million dollars with a basis of $100,000. Assume 
further that during the first (the year of donation), second and third years, B 
earns $50,000, $75,000 and $100,000, respectively. For the first year, the 
donor will be able to deduct the lesser of the patent’s FMV or its basis; here, 
$100,000. A would not be able to deduct any additional amount during the 
first year because $50,000 < $100,000. In the second year A would be able 
to deduct $25,000 ($50,000 + $75,000 - $100,000 = $25,000).  
¶12 Second, Section 882, now part of the IRC, creates a sliding scale 
that decreases the amount a donor can deduct based on earnings of the 
donee in future years.62 During the first (year of donation) and second years 
after the donation, aggregate earnings that surpass the deduction allowed for 
the initial charitable gift are completely deductible.63 In subsequent years, a 
sliding scale reduces the deductibility of the donee’s earnings.64 During the 
third year after the donation, the donor may deduct 90% of the donee’s 
earnings.65 The rates drop to 80% and 70% for the fourth and fifth years, 
respectively.66 The lowest rate of 10% is reached during the tenth year, and 
no deductions are permitted after the twelfth year of the donation.67 
Returning to the example above, university B earned $50,000, $75,000 and 
$100,000 in the first through third years, respectively. Applying the sliding-
scale rule will not effect the deduction of $25,000 in the second year, but 
will limit A’s deduction to $90,000 as opposed to $100,000 in the third year 
($100,000 x .9 = $90,000).   
                                                     
59 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2005); see also CONFERENCE REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 534; Fred Stokeld, ETI Repeal Bill Would Tighten Rules on 
Vehicle, Patent Donations, 105 Tax Notes 293, 294 (Oct. 18, 2004).  
60 I.R.C. § 170(m)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).  
61 Id. at (m)(2). 
62 Id. at (m)(7). 
63 Id. at (m)(1), (2), (7).   
64 Id. at (m)(7). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at (m)(5). 
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¶13 The IRC also prohibits the donor from deducting the value of any 
earnings beyond the donated IP’s life.68 Finally, the IRC makes the 
deductibility of future earnings contingent on certain filing requirements. 
For example, after the donor informs the donee of its intent to take 
additional deductions,69 the donee must then file annual returns reporting 
the earnings generated by the donated IP.70 The donor must also acquire 
written substantiation from the donee concerning those earnings.71 
III.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
A. Does it Really Matter? 
¶14 There is much at stake in our nation’s patent and IP donation 
policy. A strong relationship between the private business sector and our 
nation’s research institutions would help create jobs, fuel the economy, and 
develop the technology to “improve the lives of our citizens.”72 
Furthermore, the International Intellectual Property Institute73 has 
associated lagging international competitiveness and innovation, the risk of 
failing to fully exploit current resources due to inefficient markets for 
innovation, and the loss of patents and ideas through abandonment with 
poor IP donation policies.74 Together, these considerations make a 
compelling case for taking IP donation policy seriously.  
B. What Does a Good Policy Contain?  
¶15 Derek Bok, faculty chair of the Hauser Center on Non-profits at 
Harvard University, has advised Congress that one of the biggest concerns 
in the area of charitable contributions is that of over-legislating and 
therefore doing more harm than good.75 Because of this concern, Bok 
asserts that the best approach to addressing problems with charitable 
                                                     
68 Id. at (m)(6).  The life of IP is the time period for which the property is 
protected by a patent.  
69 Id. at (m)(8)(B). 
70 I.R.C. § 6050L(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2005). 
71 Id.  
72 Cerny, supra note 40, at 47.  
73 A not-for-profit organization “dedicated to increasing awareness and 
understanding of the use of intellectual property as a tool for economic growth.” 
INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., at 
http://www.iipi.org/nav_about/background.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).     
74 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 11-12.  
75 Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good 
Charities, Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Senate, 108th Cong., 
(Jun. 22, 2004) (statement of Derek Bok, chair of Hauser Center on Non-profits 
and Philanthropy, Harvard University), available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204dbtest.pdf. 
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contributions is to target known abuses first,76 such as overvaluation, and 
then to proceed with caution. With respect to IP specifically, in addition to 
targeting known abuses, this iBrief argues that a good policy should also 
create appropriate incentives for IP holders to donate their property to 
organizations capable of putting it to good use,77 thereby benefiting 
society.78 
C. Analysis of Section 170 
¶16 Overvaluation. Section 170 deals effectively with the problem of 
overvaluation.  However, rather than rigorously defining valuation 
standards,79 the provision combats this problem by limiting a donor’s 
deduction to the lesser of the property’s FMV or cost basis.80 Substantiation 
of the earnings is accomplished by requiring the donor to acquire financial 
information from the donee regarding earnings from the patent.81 This 
information must be reported to the IRS for the donor’s future deductions to 
be valid.82  
¶17  Incentives. Section 170 falls drastically short in the area of 
incentives, primarily because the future earnings of the donation are only 
partially deductible.83 Rightfully, this provision has been widely criticized 
as being donor unfriendly.84 Some practitioners have noted that many 
patents do not become profitable until several years after their donation,85 
preventing donors from taking larger deductions for profitable patents. One 
expert speculates that this provision may limit corporations to deducting no 
more than 20% of the donated patent’s FMV.86 If true, this could 
significantly reduce the flow of IP from corporations to universities and not-
for-profit entities.87 Therefore, while Section 170 resolves the overvaluation 
problem, its chilling effect on donations in general is problematic. 
Certainly, a superior policy would encourage donations while also 
correcting the overvaluation problem.   
                                                     
76 Id.  
77 See IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 9 (arguing that only donees with strong 
research technologies should be eligible for donated patents).  
78 See Cerny, supra note 40, at 47. 
79 See IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 40 (arguing that the lackadaisical IRS 
guidelines are largely responsible for charitable contribution abuses). 
80 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2005).  
81 I.R.C. § 6050L(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2005). 
82 Id. 
83 See id. at § 170(m)(7) (displaying the sliding scale rate reduction). 
84 Stopping Abuses, supra note 7.  
85 Id. 
86 Id.  This is because FMV measurements typically include the future expected 
revenues from an asset for a specified period of time. 
87 See id.  
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D. Possible Alternatives 
1. American Society of Appraisers  
¶18 The American Society of Appraisers (ASA) has made some 
valuable suggestions88 for improving the previous FMV donation system.89 
First, the IRS must strictly define a “qualified appraiser.” Current 
regulations allow almost anyone, even someone without professional 
training, to work as a qualified appraiser.90 Such a standard hardly promotes 
accurate and consistent valuation. Second, the ASA suggests that the IRS 
establish mandatory valuation guidelines for the appraisal of property.91 
Finally, the ASA has argued that the IRS should monitor for high value 
donations,92 allowing the agency to identify donations with 
uncharacteristically high valuations.  
¶19 Overvaluation. While the ASA’s call for specific standards for 
qualified appraisers and appraisal methods addresses Congress 
overvaluation concerns, the ASA’s confidence that workable standards 
could be set remains questionable,93 especially considering the inherent 
difficulty involved in valuating IP.94 Still, the IRS could set standards that, 
if nothing else, would bring consistency to the process.  
¶20 Incentives. This approach would continue to create incentives for IP 
holders by allowing a full market value deduction for their patent. The 
ASA’s suggestions, however, stop short of creating incentives for the donor 
to find the best suited donee for their donation.  
2. Consistent Policy?   
¶21 Proponents of another plan argue that the recent changes to Section 
170 are inconsistent with other tax laws and have therefore criticized 
lawmakers for failing to use consistent policy rationales in crafting tax 
legislation.95 They recommend a more consistent policy with an additional 
safeguard for large donations. For example, the law could require two 
appraisals for any donation exceeding a certain amount. Further, both 
appraisals would have to come from members of an appraisal society 
                                                     
88 The ASA’s suggestions, while valuable, should be viewed with caution.  
Clearly the ASA benefits from a system which grants a substantial amount of 
responsibility to appraisers.  
89 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 40-41.  
90 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(i) (West 2005). 
91 IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 41. 
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Greater Good, supra note 6.  
95 Stopping Abuses, supra note 7, at 701.  
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required to follow strict ethical guidelines.96 The final amount of the 
deduction could be the average of the two estimates. A final addition to this 
plan might limit donations to certain qualified research institutions that 
would be capable of taking advantage of complex patents and other IP 
products.97  
¶22 Overvaluation. This plan addresses the overvaluation problem only 
insofar as professional appraisers are able to develop their own valuation 
guidelines and follow them. Without consistent valuation guidelines 
throughout the industry, appraisals will likely continue to vary widely 
depending on the appraiser used.98  
¶23 Incentives. This proposal would encourage donations of IP by 
assuring a FMV deduction. The provision requiring the donation to go to a 
qualified donee is a good addition, although it could be more targeted. 
Many institutions have research technologies, but some are better suited 
than others, depending on the IP. A policy that encourages donors to give IP 
to those entities best able to exploit it would increase the likelihood of 
productive uses beneficial to society.99 
E. Hybrid Proposal 
¶24 The major disadvantage of the proposals outlined above is that they 
lack a mechanism to ensure that orphan patents and other IP get into the 
hands of the right donee.100 While Section 170 does provide donors with 
incentive to find a good donee,101 the broader incentives for the actual 
donation are too limited.102  
¶25 A possible alternative combines the use of an initial FMV deduction 
with an additional component to help insure the best suited donee has access 
to the IP. Under this plan, an IP holder will be able to donate orphan patents 
and deduct their FMV as determined by a qualified appraiser. Deduction of 
                                                     
96 See id. at 700 (suggesting additional, independent appraiser chosen by an 
appraisal society). 
97 Id.; IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 9.  
98 See IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing that even appraisals made in 
good faith may vary substantially depending on the appraiser used); see also, 
Cammarano & Riley, supra note 36 (showing that valuation of IP is very 
difficult).  
99 See Cerny, supra note 40, at 47; IP DONATIONS, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing 
that efficient allocation of IP benefits society).  
100 See Feder, supra note 33. 
101 An incentive for the donor to find a good donee is created because the former 
is allowed additional future deductions if the IP generates sufficient revenue 
within the first 11 years of the donation. See I.R.C. § 170(m)(7) (LexisNexis 
2005). 
102 See Stopping Abuses, supra note 7, at 700. 
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the full amount will occur only if the company uses a third party broker 
whose primary goal is matching donors with appropriate donees.103 The 
broker will be either a government entity or a not-for-profit organization 
paid by the government for this purpose. The funding for such a program 
will be generated from the increased tax revenue resulting from more 
accurate valuations.  
¶26 The third party broker must have expertise with a wide variety of IP 
and be in contact with universities and other appropriate donees on a regular 
basis to keep apprised of what types of donations they are capable of 
exploiting. This will by no means be an easy task, but does not seem to be 
beyond the realm of possibility. Perhaps much of the work could be done 
pro bono by working professionals.  Obviously, conflicts of interest would 
need to be monitored carefully.  
¶27 For this plan to work, the IRS must set rigorous guidelines and 
standards for qualified appraisers and their valuation methods.104 While the 
difficulty of coming up with valuation guidelines remains an obstacle, 
presumably, the private sector would be willing to help the IRS develop an 
appropriate methodology. As for getting the donated IP into the appropriate 
hands, some organizations have already begun to assist donors in finding 
donees for their patents.105 Such organizations could be instrumental in 
helping bring about this reform.  
¶28 Valuation. This policy would effectively solve the overvaluation 
problem that has plagued the previous FMV donation system by requiring 
the IRS to set clear guidelines and standards regarding appraisers and their 
valuation methods. Again, while not perfect, this proposal would at least 
add considerable consistency to a valuation process which is currently 
completely subjective.106  
¶29 Incentives. More importantly, this plan requires a donor to use an IP 
broker, thereby increasing the likelihood that the IP goes to a donee capable 
of taking full advantage of the charitable gift’s potential. This plan is a big 
step in the right direction as it increases the likelihood that donated IP will 
not go to waste. 
                                                     
103 See id. at 10 (advocating a third party broker scheme).  
104 See id. at 40-41 (arguing that the relaxed regulations promulgated by the IRS 
have led to much of the charitable donations related abuses in recent years).  
105 Id. at 10. 
106 See Greater Good, supra note 6 (explaining that the valuation of IP is 
extremely subjective). 
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CONCLUSION 
¶30 Section 882 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 has 
drastically changed the law with respect to charitable donations of IP.107 
While it effectively deals with the overvaluation problems common in the 
previous system, it fails to fully consider the importance of strong donor 
incentives. Other suggested alternatives may adequately address the 
importance of promoting donations, but fail to provide a mechanism by 
which the IP ends up in the hands that have the best capability to exploit its 
benefits. A hybrid policy that solves the overvaluation problem while still 
providing incentives for donors to give patents to a well-suited donee is a 
superior alternative. The policy would permit donors to take FMV 
deductions, but only where a donor has acquired an appraisal from a 
qualified appraiser. Strict appraiser qualifications and valuation standards 
would also be implemented as part of the policy. Further, donors would 
work with a broker whose sole responsibility would be to help find an 
appropriate donee for the IP, thus minimizing the likelihood that the IP 
would go to waste. Such a policy would help to curb overvaluation, and 
thus accomplish the designs of Congress without seriously undermining the 
incentive to donate IP.  
                                                     
107 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8 (explaining the differences between 
section 882, now part of section 170 of the IRC, and the previous law). 
